Connecticut
State v. Boscarino, 86 Conn. App. 447, 861 A.2d
579 (2004)
The defendant
appealed his conviction of one count of first-degree stalking and five counts of
second-degree harassment, alleging (among other things) insufficient evidence to
support the stalking conviction and an improper consolidation of two separate
cases, with two separate victims, that constituted the harassment
convictions.
In the first case, the defendant
confessed that he had sent several letters containing pornographic material to
the victim, who, in the course of her job at an employment agency, had met the
defendant at a job fair several months earlier. The defendant admitted that he sent the
letters "out of anger for not getting a job" through the agency, and entered a
guilty Alford plea (allowing the defendant to plead guilty without
admitting guilt) to two counts of second-degree harassment. The defendant was sentenced to probation
with the condition that he have no contact with the victim. Four months later,
the victim collected resumes at another job fair and, although she didn't see the
defendant at the fair, later noticed the defendant's removed her stack of resumes. The victim then received pornographic
e-mails, of which the police could not trace their origin. At a later job fair, the defendant sat
in a booth next to the victim, made eye contact with her, and continued to
circle the job fair making eye contact several times throughout the day. The victim feared for her safety, asking
a co-worker to walk her to her car.
After the victim received several additional pornographic letters at
work, the defendant was charged with first-degree stalking and three counts of
second-degree harassment.
In the second case, the defendant
harassed another woman from a different employment agency. Similar to the first case, the defendant
appeared at job fairs and sent pornographic e-mails to the victim. The defendant was charged with three
counts of second-degree harassment in this case.
The trial court joined these two
cases, and the jury convicted the defendant of all three counts of second-degree
harassment of the second victim and one count of first-degree stalking and two
counts of second-degree harassment of the first victim. On appeal by the defendant, the
Appellate Court of Connecticut reversed the defendant's stalking conviction of
the first victim, finding that the defendant had not "repeatedly followed" the
victim as required by the state's stalking statute.
The mere presence of the
defendant's resume after the first job fair did not prove that the defendant "maintained
sufficient visual or physical proximity [to the victim], uninterrupted, over a
substantial enough period of time to constitute "following." Therefore, the court could only
recognize once instance of "following" (at the subsequent job fair), which did
not satisfy the statutory requirements for a stalking conviction.
The appellate court confirmed the
remaining convictions for second-degree harassment in both cases, holding that
there was no prejudice to the defendant when the two cases were joined because
there were specific jury instructions to the effect that the two cases were to
be treated separately.
Connecticut v. Jackson, 742 A.2d 812, 56 Conn. App. 264
(Conn. App. Ct. 2000)
The court found
that the stalking statute was not vague on its face, nor as applied to
the defendant's conduct. There was sufficient evidence to find the defendant
guilty of stalking. The defendant maintained uninterrupted visual and
physical proximity with the victim for substantial periods of time. The phrase
"acting repeatedly" in the context of the statute meant precisely what the
commonly approved usage of the word suggested acting on more than one occasion.
Connecticut v. Cummings, 701 A.2d 663, 46 Conn. App. 661
(Conn. App. Ct. 1997)
The appeals court stated that the stalking
statute was not vague and that a person of common understanding would understand
what conduct is prohibited by the words "likely to alarm." They also held that
the standard to be applied by the jury in determining the reasonableness of the
victim's fear is a subjective-objective one. The subjective part consisted of
the facts viewed from viewpoint of victim, "did she in fact fear for her
physical safety?" The objective part was to ask, "was that fear
reasonable?"
Connecticut v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90, 43
Conn. Supp. 46 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993)
The court held that the
stalking statute was not vague on its face. They also found that while the
statute implicated the right to move about freely, it was justified by the
state's compelling interest in criminalizing stalking behavior. The defendant
had followed the victim in his car. He parked behind her car and watched her and
then continued to follow her around the town. He also drove and walked up and
down the victim's street. The court stated that the statute was constitutional,
despite the fact that it restricted a person's right to move about freely. The
statute applied only to those who acted with the specific intention of causing
others to fear for their physical safety. Furthermore, that fear of physical
safety had to be reasonable, the conduct undertaken willfully, not mistakenly,
and it must occur repeatedly.